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In the ‘Phaedrus’ (230d), Socrates states that he prefers the city to the 
countryside, because he learns nothing from landscapes and trees, whereas 
he learns a lot from the life of people in the city. Kierkegaard, who loved 
to pose as a dandy, »a man dressed in modern clothes, wearing spectacles 
and smoking cigars«, adopted this saying, and even if he did not consider 
Copenhagen more than a small market town parodying a world-histori­
cal capitol, he gave this city a prominent place in his writings. He really 
was a ‘vigilant Copenhagener’.
Paris, the capitol of the nineteenth century, was Copenhagen’s ‘sig­
nificant other’, but to Kierkegaard the insignificance of Copenhagen was 
a quality, and he lets Frater Taciturnus speak up against all the praise of 
Paris, decrying the bigness of everything in Paris, the gap between ap­
pearances and reality, and summing it in the exclamation: ‘Poor Paris!’
George Pattison has chosen ‘Poor Paris!’ as the title of his book on 
Kierkegaard’s critique o f ‘the Spectacular City’, and he gives some won­
derful, contrasting examples of Johan Ludvig Heiberg’s and Kierkegaard’s 
views on Paris. This said, he actually is very reserved as concerns inter­
national references, and a few quotations may serve to introduce and il­
lustrate the general importance of phenomenon of the spectacle.
In the 1820’s, -30’s and -40’s, the question of urban spectacles and of 
the city as a spectacle itself occupied a central position in the debate on 
the modern city. In 1822, with reference to the ongoing ‘London im­
provements’, Charles Lamb asked: »And what else but an accumulation 
of sights — endless sights — is a great city; or for what else is it desirable?« 
In 1845, however, Friedrich Engels noted that the beautification of the 
big city, the replacement of narrow overcrowded streets by broad, pan­
oramic boulevards and places of entertainment, served to conceal from 
the eyes of the rich people »the misery and grime which form the com­
plement of their wealth«.
Hypocrisy or not, London, Paris, New York, and Berlin were recon­
structed to create spectacular urban spaces, and in 1841 Théophile Gautier 
announced »the arrival of the epoch of purely visual spectacles«, while 
Ralph Waldo Emerson in 1842 explained why he had become all eyes: 
»In New York City, as in cities generally, one seems to lose all substance, 
and becomes surface in a world of surfaces«. Kierkegaard never visited 
New York, London, or Paris, but he visited Berlin several times, and in 
Repetition he lets Constantin Constantius declare that his favourite place 
in Berlin was the Gendarmenmarkt with the Neues Schauspielhaus, a square 
and a building, specifically created by Karl Friedrich Schinkel as a modern, 
panoramic, and spectacular urban space that would satisfy the need for all- 
embracing views in a world characterized by fragmentation and confusion.
In 1843, however, with the opening of the Tivoli Gardens, the 
epoch of purely visual spectacles and the world of enticing surfaces also 
came to Copenhagen. And, with »a nice irony«, as Pattison puts it, this 
was also the year when Kierkegaard with his publication of Either/Or 
opened up philosophical reflection to the relationship between modern 
urban life and the aesthetical attitude. Johannes is not only a seducer, but 
also a flaneur, and the only thing he is looking for is visual pleasure.
Pattison’s well-written and well-informed account of Kierkegaard’s 
critical response to the new world of spectacles — ‘Udvorteshedens Spek- 
takeV — has a narrative drive inspired by the Bildungsroman and perhaps by 
spiritual biography, thus reminding one of Augustine who would force­
fully and literally turn downcast eyes when confronted with the murder­
ous and obscene spectacles of Ancient Rome. The clarity of Pattison s 
presentation already reveals itself in the titles of the seven chapters of the 
book. In chapter one, ‘Kierkegaard enters the spectacular city’, Pattison 
enters into the discussion of the various aspects of this spectacularization: 
the remodelleing of the city, self-modelling of the dandy and the flaneur 
who live to see and be seen, the new visual technologies such as the 
panorama, the kaleidoscope, and the daguerreotype. In chapter two, 
‘Unmasking the spectacle’, Pattison shows how Kierkegaard interprets 
Paris as a harbinger of the process of modernization and how he con­
ceives of this as a process of demoralization and levelling. In chapter 
three, ‘Kierkegaard goes home’, and the contemporary reality and the 
ideal of ‘home’ is elucidated with carefully chosen examples. In chapter 
four, Pattison analyzes ‘the city in Kierkegaard’s Bildungsromaner , the 
genre structured on the opposition of home and homelessness, and he 
offers some thoughtful observations on the interplay between city and 
country in Kierkegaard’s novelistic philosophy. The fifth chapter focuses
on ‘the urbane Johannes Climacus’ and the three scenes in the Postsrcipt 
where Copenhagen makes its appearance. The account of Kierkegaard’s 
discussion of Frederiksberg Garden, Assistens Churchyard and the Deer 
Park reveals two things: the roles that concretion and differentiation play 
in Kierkegaard’s observations -  and the lurking tendency to collapse all 
differences in the damnation of the city. Finally, after 1846, according to 
Pattison — ‘Kierkegaard goes to church’ — and praising ‘the downcast eyes’ 
of the true Christian, Kierkegaard of course must lose sight of Copen­
hagen: the actual social environment of Copenhagen is replaced by such 
all-embracing, ready-made concepts as ‘the world’, ‘the crowd’, and 
‘man’ while the seducers, assessors, and servant girls of the past are re­
placed by Pharisees, tax-collectors, and sinful women. The concluding 
seventh chapter discusses the value of Kierkegaard’s critique of modern 
and urban life, and even though Pattison recognizes Kierkegaard’s am­
bivalence, he emphasizes that it would be a mistake »to hear Kierkegaard 
as calling on us simply to abandon the call and care of the social mo­
ment«, for this moment is an urban moment, and Kierkegaard reminds 
us that our ‘urban humanity’ raises questions which cannot be answered 
by »the methods of natural, human, and social science«.
In Pattison’s concluding remarks, I think there is a tendency to col­
lapse the development of Kierkegaard’s position towards the city into a 
too unified position. Kresten Nordentoft -  who is not mentioned in the 
book — has described how Kierkegaard turned from a fierce critic of the 
opposition to a fierce critic of the establishment, with a growing sympa­
thy for the man in the street, and I think it would have been interesting 
to read a discussion of the relationship -  or lack of continuity — between 
the downcast eyes of the man who went to church and the burning eyes 
of the man who discovered the man in the street.
Nordentoft also draws attention to another kind of historical change: 
namely, Kierkegaard’s sweeping sketches of the differences between Greek 
Antiquity, medieval Christianity, and Modernity, and here it is highly 
relevant for the discussion of the spectacle that Kierkegaard focuses on 
the eye and the gaze. In premodern societies a gaze of admiration was 
the link between ‘master’ and ‘slave’, whereas in modern societies an en­
vious and suspicious gaze breaks all real ties between people. Pattison 
does not ignore this theme, but I think his analyses and historical expla­
nations would have gained by a more detailed and a more systematic de­
scription of the visual exchanges in Kierkegaard’s work.
A theme that goes almost unnoticed in Pattison’s book is Kierke­
gaard’s reflections on the comic. Ever since Cicero coined the word ‘ur- 
banitas \  this word has also had the meaning of wit, and wit and other as­
pects of the comic have been a persistent theme in Kierkegaard’s writ­
ings, from The Concept of Irony, through the chapter on farce in Repeti­
tion, up to The Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Since Pattison compares 
Kierkegaard to Baudelaire, it might be relevant to mention that Baude­
laire wrote an essay on the essence of laughter, where he explicitly 
pointed to the importance of spectacle in the experience of the comic. 
And later Bergson, in his seminal work Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning 
of the Comic, notes emotional distance as a common feature of the field 
of aesthetics and the field of comedy.
Pattison kindly notes that he has been introduced to the concept of 
the spectacular by a few papers by the undersigned, and therefore it will 
come as no surprise that I share the interests and the perspectives of his 
book. But I would like to add that reading ‘Poor ParisV has been an eye­
opening experience for me to find out how widely the concept of the 
spectacular applies to Kierkegaard’s writings. Indeed, it is Pattison’s cross­
reading of Kierkegaard which has made me think of yet other fields of 
the spectacular -  such as the comic. Obviously, Kierkegaard was a keen 
observer of the signs of his time, and I think he would have loved to 
have read Gustave Flaubert’s Dictionnaire des Idées reçues which includes 
this centenary commonplace: Exposition: sujet de délire du XIXème siècle\
Martin Zerlang
Darío González
E ssa i su r  l ’o n t o lo g ie  k ie r k e g a a r d ie n e :
Id é a lité  e t  d é te r m in a t io n
Editions U Harmattan, Paris, 1998, 220 pp.
In his preface to Essai sur l’ontologie kierkegaardiene: Idéalité et déter­
mination, Jacques Colette observes that the subject of the book is »Kier­
kegaard the philosopher, the technician of the concept« (p. 7). An ex­
tremely apt turn of phrase, since the point of Gonzalez’s book is to show 
precisely how Kierkegaard, using the terminology of philosophy in gen­
eral and German Idealism in particular, articulated his own particular vi­
sion. In other words, how Kierkegaard constructed his own house using
other people’s bricks. Even more important for Gonzalez is the notion 
that Kierkegaard also makes bricks of his own. The book itself makes 
four movements and culminates in a fifth. The first chapter of the book 
is devoted to showing the distinction between quantity and quality and 
the epistemological consequences of this distinction for Kierkegaard. 
The next move is to show how certain Christian notions are thought 
philosophically, such as infinite difference, sin, despair, and the concept 
of being ‘before God,’ is explanatory movement prefaces the third chap­
ter where the relationship that obtains between ideality and temporality 
is explored. Here ideas which are normally viewed as peculiarly religious 
-  such as ‘the moment’, ‘eternity’, and ‘the occasion’ — are re-worked 
with an eye to their overall philosophical significance. As philosophical 
concepts, they lay the foundation for the fourth and final chapter: the 
real and repetition. In this chapter, sections 4.6 (‘Inter-esse and Ideality’) 
and 4.7 (‘The Extensive and The Intensive’) are especially intriguing. 
One sees most clearly how Gonzalez is not explaining Kierkegaard’s 
view of existentialism but of existence and not that it is but why it is, 
how it could have come to be. The fifth move is found in the conclu­
sion. It is the dialectic between manifestation and determination, where 
manifestation is defined as »the space within which presence in general is 
constituted« (p. 201). And thus we see why Gonzalez is truly dealing 
with Kierkegaard’s ontology: his notion of how being came to be is key 
to understanding anything else about Kierkegaard’s philosophy. To un­
derstand him first as a ‘Christian thinker’ and then as a philosopher is to 
do Kierkegaard a disservice. It is González’s intention to show that the 
philosophical explanations which Kierkegaard created and re-created to 
philosophically justify his view of the world are pivotal to even begin 
understanding his view of Christianity. As such, the book examines very 
critically and explains quite carefully not only Kierkegaard’s own use of 
concepts but also the numerous interpretations found in the German, 
French, Danish, English, Spanish, and Italian secondary literature. In so 
doing, the author nests Kierkegaard’s concepts of being within the histo­
ry of Western philosophy from Kant to Levinas. Thus, the book is not 
only a serious philosophical discussion of Kierkegaard’s concepts, it is 
also an adroitly located discussion within history. For the serious reader 
of Kierkegaard as a philosopher, this is not a book to miss.
Stacey E. Ake
Isak Winkel Holm
T a n k e n  i B i l le d e t .  S ø r e n  K ie r k e g a a rd s  P o e t ik
[Thought in Image: Søren Kierkegaard s Poetics]
Gyldendal, Copenhagen, i 998, 370 pp.
Isak Winkel Holm s defence of his dissertation, of which this book is a 
slightly reworked version, together with his critics’ reports, will have giv­
en readers of Kierkegaardiana 20 some insight into the main arguments of 
this book and the kinds of issues it raises. It will not, therefore, be appro­
priate here either to repeat at any length Winkel Holm’s own summary 
of the thesis, nor the specific criticism brought against it. In what fol­
lows, therefore, I shall simply touch on some of the points I found most 
interesting in reading this elegant, provocative,and rewarding study.
The book turns upon the insight that, in addition to his espousal of 
an explicit aesthetic theory (which is, however, almost entirely second­
hand Heiberg and Hegel, according to Holm), Kierkegaard’s actual writ­
ing demonstrates a distinctive poetics, i.e., a certain understanding of the 
nature and manner of literary practice, that is far more interesting. 
Whereas Kierkegaard’s aesthetics subscribe to a rationalistic view of art as 
the vehicle for expressing clear and distinct ideas, his poetics demonstrate 
the ineluctable interconnectedness of ideas and their sensuous and his­
torical material. Against Kierkegaard himself, then, Holm argues that 
Kierkegaard shows how poetic writing and, consequently, philosophy it­
self (insofar as this is dependent on pre-philosophical literature) remain 
locked into a situation of struggle, hesitation, ambivalence, caught in the 
linguistic space between the sensuousnes of the image and the clarity of 
thought. An appealing and effective illustration which Winkel Holm 
calls upon periodically throughout the book is that of the sea nymphs il­
lustrated in Dr. W. Vollmer’s 1836 dictionary of mythology (and repro­
duced on p. 27 of Winkel Holm’s book). These are figures from Norse 
mythology that seem to take shape in the foamy crests of ocean waves. 
However, unlike Venus, born from the waves in such a way as to emerge 
in a single moment as a perfectly-formed and independent being, these 
nymphs never break loose from their generative milieu, and disappear 
whence they came, back into the ceaseless surge of the sea. Thus they 
can illustrate both Kierkegaard’s Donjuán — a figure who is always in the 
process of coming to appearance but never fully emerges into autono­
mous existence — and Plato’s repeated relapse into mythology. But Win-
kel Holm does not only argue his case in connection with Kierkegaard’s 
more obviously ‘poetic’ writing (as in Either/Or I) but is also developed 
with reference to the discussion of original sin in, e.g., The Concept of 
Anxiety. In this latter case, Winkel Holm sees the poetological oscillation 
between image and thought as strongly analogous to the theological ef­
fort to find a middle way between Augustinianism, in which human 
freedom is determined or constrained by forces beyond its control, and 
Pelagianism, in which a man is regarded as master of himself — and, in­
terestingly, of the debate occasioned in 1824 by one Dr Howtiz ) and 
engaging the attention of many of Kierkegaard’s teachers) as to the ex­
tent to which human beings’ so-called ‘free’ actions are in fact caused by 
physiological factors and are consequently susceptible of being explained 
medically as forms of sickness.
In his response to Arne Gron, however, Winkel Holm makes clear 
that he is not looking simply to deconstruct anthropology into poetics, 
as if the outworking of such critical topics in existential anthropology 
were nothing but a reflection of a primordial linguistic happening. Rather, 
he is seeking to demonstrate how valuable the interchange between po­
etics and philosophy can be (Kierkegaardiana 20, p. 172). In fact, I would 
say, he does more than this: he shows how deeply the aesthetic and 
philosophical aspects of Kierkegaard’s authorship penetrate into one an­
other, and each is continually needed for understanding the other. For 
the point is not simply to deconstruct Kierkegaard, to show that his at­
tempts to construct meaningful discourse repeatedly collapse into chatter 
(as Fenves argues), but to explore precisely the middle ground between 
authorial activity and passivity, between speech and noise, word and vi­
sion, spirit and sense. This middle ground, what Heidegger (in the con­
text of his Hölderlin interpretation) would call ‘The Between’, is the al­
chemical chamber, it seems, in which the real magic of Kierkegaard’s au­
thorship occurs and where, for Winkel Holm, its main fascination lies.
Undoubtedly a chief merit of this study lies in way in which the ar­
gument is developed through a succession of close readings of particular 
texts, such as the analysis of Pap. Ill B 179 (an encounter with blind 
street musicians) in relation to Kierkegaard’s interpretation of Don Juan. 
There are some truly wonderful passages of this ilk throughout. Winkel 
Holm’s criticisms of Adorno’s readings of Kierkegaard are also devastat­
ing, even though he also takes a certain orientation from Adorno’s aim 
of restoring the text to its ‘literality’, to what it shows rather than what it 
consciously asserts. As he points out, Adorno’s book on Kierkegaard is
one of the most translated texts in the whole secondary literature, but, as 
the 26-year old Adorno is shown repeatedly to have approached Kierke­
gaard with utter disregard for the texts themselves, it is really hard to see 
why. Even when Adorno does linger on a passage of Kierkegaard’s actual 
writing for more than the time it takes to produce a suitably cryptic put- 
down, he misreads Kierkegaard’s literary purpose, and overlooks key ele­
ments — a point Winkel Holm illustrates with particular reference to Jo­
hannes the Seducer’s evocation of the sitting room in Cordelia’s house 
(which, according to Adorno, is a key to Kierkegaard’s authorship as a 
whole). Such irreverence is welcome, and a powerful antidote to the 
chronically servile attitude of contemporary work in the humanities to­
wards over-inflated critical reputations, the invocation of which is re­
peatedly used to by-pass the labour of evidence and argument.
Nevertheless there are points with which I would disagree, and quite 
strongly. It is obvious from my own previous work that I regard Kierke­
gaard’s actual aesthetic theory as more extensive, more interesting and 
more important than Winkel Holm admits. But this is not simply to 
negate his own positive account of Kierkegaard’s poetics. Rather, I see 
the aesthetics as developing precisely to the same point that the poetics 
show in textual close-up (Winkel Holm, incidentally, likes to use filmic 
metaphors). For Kierkegaard does not simply replicate Heiberg’s formal­
ism. In addition to the presence of other key elements (e.g. P. M. Mol- 
ler’s personalism), Kierkegaard’s Heibergianism is qualified by two fac­
tors. Firstly, his sense — as opposed to Heiberg — of the irresolveability of 
the crisis of contemporary reality, and his consequent refusal to accept 
that an age of reflection can give birth to a stable or enduring social or­
der. That reflection thus finds itself caught up in a never-ending state of 
flux means that the ‘classical’ aspiration of Heibergian aesthetics cannot 
be fulfilled and that, just as Winkel Holm shows happening in Kierke­
gaard’s poetics, literary form will never be able to achieve utter clarity or 
finality. Secondly, Kierkegaard’s concern with the human subject’s reli­
gious situation brings him up against contexts and situations in which 
there is a kind of opacity that inherently resists aesthetic representation 
and reception, or to which such representation and reception can never 
do justice on account of the apophatic implications of divine alterity. 
These zeitkritisch and religious angles therefore point — albeit from, as it 
were, the outside — towards the same dimension of radical disturbance 
that Winkel Holm elicits from the poetic character of the text. In this 
connection I would also want to question Winkel Holm’s professed ex­
elusion of the sublime, and his self-limitation to the aesthetics of the 
beautiful (57-8). In particular I would want to question whether there is 
really a hard and fast distinction to be drawn here. Even in Kant s own 
terms there seems to be the possibility of some kind of cross-over from 
the arabesques of the aesthetics of the beautiful (a point of constant ref­
erence for Winkel Holm) and the numerical sublime, simply in terms of 
the final ungraspability of any extended arabesque sequence. This is ob­
viously not the place to argue the case in full, but I would suggest that, 
at many points, Winkel Holm s own discussion could well be couched in 
terms of an aesthetics of sublimity. The advantage of doing so is precisely 
to do with the way in which, for Kant, the sublime marks a threshold of 
human freedom and, therefore, of the ethical. This, I suggest, would open 
up a fruitful avenue for further exploration of the area of common ground 
that emerges in the exchange between Winkel Holm and Arne Gron.
George Pattison
Søren Kierkegaard 
La m a la ttia  p e r  la m o r te ,
ed. and trans, by Ettore Rocca,
Donzelli editore, Roma 1999, xxvii + 212 pp.
This third translation into Italian of Sygdommen til Døden, by Ettore 
Rocca, comes 50 years after the previous ones and will probably become 
the definitive edition for future Italian scholars because of its philological 
accuracy, its stylistic elegance, and the range and quality of the critical 
apparatus. The new translation, written during a period at the SK Re­
search Center in Copenhagen and based on the second edition of the 
Samlede Værker (SV2 , 11, 129- 272) — but also taking into consideration 
the first edition of this work and the draft manuscripts prepared for the 
new critical edition of the Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter — aspires to »offer 
this work in radically new terms to the Italian philosophical, psychologi­
cal and theological debate, removing the obscurities and distortions that 
up to now have obscured its power and beauty«.
The task of ‘cleaning’ this masterpiece begins with a new rigorous 
translation, both precise and elegant, starting from the title, separating it 
from previous Italian translations, deceptively entitled La malattia mortale 
(lit. den dødelige sygdom, the deadly sickness). The choice of the new title,
which also does justice to the biblical quotation from which it is taken 
(cf. John 11, 4), is thoroughly and convincingly justified in the Introduc­
tion of the translator, where, taking into account what is presented in 
this pseudonymous text by Anti-Climacus, a distinction is made between 
a malattia mortale, a sickness which leads to physical death, and that malat­
tia per la morte which is despair, a sickness of the self which makes living 
the act of dying, but denying the consolation of physical death.
In his Introduction, Rocca also explains the form and the structure of 
the work, accurately following the Kierkegaardian text, both examining 
and commenting on — also using helpful diagrams — all the figures of this 
»phenomenology of the despairing spirit«. And yet the merit of this In­
troduction does not finish with a merely acriticai paraphrase of the First 
Part of the book (‘The Sickness unto Death is Despair’); it also tries to 
give back the due theoretical dignity of the Second Part (‘Despair is Sin’), 
too often overlooked or undervalued by the many lay interpretations (not 
only Italian) proposed in the 20th century: »instead the work runs, almost 
hurries towards the second part where it finds its historical context, its 
theoretical foundation and the climax of its phenomenology« (p. XX). 
Only in the second part — the translator argues — can the subtitle of The 
Sickness Unto Death (‘A Christian Psychological Exposition for Edifica­
tion and Awakening’) be fully understood, since »it is only in the second 
part that Christianity and ‘the Christian content’ become central« (ibid.). 
In this part, firstly, the eternity of the self is sustained by the eternity of 
God, through which it is measured, and, secondly, despair is here recon­
sidered through the introduction of the concept of sin as ‘revelation’, a 
revelation that cannot be rationally understood by man as a sinner, but 
only believed as an act of faith. Rightly Rocca emphasizes how the de­
liberate references to the confessional writings of Lutheran Evangelism 
(thoroughly quoted and commented on in the notes to the translation) 
should be understood as a critical reaction »to ‘speculative theology’ in 
its many forms, both from the Hegelian right and left«, which in its nega­
tion of Christ and of the paradox that he embodies, is the last and most ex­
treme form of despair, a real ‘sickness unto death’ that infects all modernity.
Another undeniable quality of this new edition of La malattia per la 
morte is the great quantity of information and insights that can be found 
through the critical apparatus (which should be considered the widest of 
all the editions published up to now, including Hong’s edition in Kierke­
gaard's Writings). Together with the Introduction and the vast number of 
translation notes, which demonstrates the excellence of and the large
amount of research undertaken by the translator, there is also the rich 
Appendix of Kierkegaardian documents which gathers, divided in four 
groups, annotations, notes from the journals, letters and rough texts 
originally present in the early drafts of the work, which were later dis­
carded. This Appendix allows the reader to enter into Kierkegaard s activi­
ty as an author, to examine his thoughts and tribulations during the phase 
of writing and publication of The Sickness Unto Death, and to understand 
in a deeper way the unsurpassed psychological, philosophical and theo­
logical reflections expressed in this book, which Kierkegaard himself 
considered among »the most valuable I have produced« (Pap. X 1 A 95).
Andrea Scaramuccia
Isak Winkel Holm 
S ø r e n  K ie r k e g a a r d  i s ty k k e r
[Søren Kierkegaard — in pieces]
Høst & Søn, Copenhagen 1998, 126 pp.
Johan de Mylius
S ø r e n  K ie r k e g a a r d  til  h v e r d a g s b r u g
[Søren Kierkegaard for everyday use]
Aschehoug, Copenhagen 1998, 156 pp.
What upon first inspection seems to be easy can actually be difficult, 
such as, for example, quoting Kierkegaard. Often Kierkegaards quota­
tions either can hide or can allude to, in a completely private fashion, 
various events or even their own interpretation. What we perceive to be 
Kierkegaard s own text and as his own unique genius for a certain whim, 
a particular turn of phrase and whatnot, can be shown to have been de­
rived from many another author, and thus it becomes really rather (seri­
ously) difficult to talk about Kierkegaard quotations. The difficulty of 
the said task has nonetheless not deterred the two following authors, 
whose books are of the same type. They both have the same good inten­
tion: to bring fragments of Kierkegaard s texts to the reader — experi­
enced or inexperienced — and through these various individual quota­
tions thus inspire the reader to further reading. However, these two au­
thors tackle the matter in quite different ways.
Johan de Mylius draws — with very few exceptions — only upon 
Kierkegaards published works. After an introductory preface (pp. 7-12) 
the book is divided into 23 small sections with quotations (pp. 13-122). 
Thereafter, comes one section entitled ‘Explanations’ (pp. 123-128), an­
other dubbed ‘Postscript’ (pp. 129-135), a short literature list (pp. 136- 
137), and, in conclusion, a ‘Timetable’ (pp. 138-156). The book is enti­
tled ‘Kierkegaard for everyday use’. What the author means by the ex­
pression ‘everyday use’ is not entirely clear, but it seems to have to do 
with using Kierkegaard »in that way in which something like this can be 
used« (p. 11), and what this is one must certainly find out. In this regard, 
the book’s postscript is actually the best place to begin, here a hint is 
given at what it requires to read Kierkegaard. The grouping of the indi­
vidual quotations is undertaken from the position »that Kierkegaard with 
his poetical passion is present in all of his works, even in those that would 
seem to be his farthest-ranging pseudonyms« (p. 11) and can therefore 
be allowed »to demonstrate that even the most disparate of his books 
abound with surprising kinships in formulation and thought process« (p. 
11). From this starting point, the publisher creates his own collection of 
selected texts, but how could it be otherwise, when one publishes a 
book of quotations. And now the problems begin. Precise references to 
those texts from which citations are taken are not to be found. The 
reader has no possibility to trace the excerpted text and read it in con­
nection with that text which Kierkegaard published. Johan de Mylius 
has also -  in deference to the so-called modern reader (p. 12) -  arranged 
the quotations according to modern punctuation, spelling, and grammar. 
It calls extremely upon precise references, but what has the editor done 
with the text? A similar problem pops up in the section entitled ‘Expla­
nation’. The editor has placed ‘new Danish’ words in the text and re­
peated Kierkegaard’s original text in the corresponding section! At other 
places, translations replace the original and the foreign language text is 
mentioned in the back. But the author is not consistent. Some words are 
allowed to stay in the text and are then explained in the accompanying 
list. But, elsewhere, other words are simply inserted, and Kierkegaard’s 
own words are noted in the list with a kind of corresponding commen­
tary and occasionally with references made to other works. It is not pos­
sible to mention all the many problems which this strategy raises, but all 
of this section and the following timetable appear to have been complet­
ed in a fast and loose manner. The result is paradoxical enough, namely 
that the very reader who should be taken into consideration is left in the
lurch. The strategy reveals that — consciously or unconsciously — what is 
going on is actually quite the opposite of showing consideration for the 
reader; it is actually an underestimating of the readers language-related 
curiosity and his or her mere ability to read. Why shouldn’t the reader 
form an acquaintance with that Kierkegaard whom his contemporaries 
read and criticized? And where should the reader turn, when he or she 
on occasions runs into the original text and its original problems? And, 
finally, who will look after the tradition which Kierkegaard is a part of, if 
there is this constant interference with the text? In absolute fairness, this 
is precisely the question one can direct at the author. The book is being 
published at a time when secondary literature on Kierkegaard is gilded 
by many a publisher, but be careful! On average, most of the shortcuts to 
Kierkegaard are detours. And this is the first and last thing which the 
reader must determine for him- or herself.
Isak Winkel Holm draws upon quotations from Kierkegaard’s pub­
lished and unpublished texts as well as Kierkegaard’s journals and papers. 
After an introductory preface (pp. 5-14) the book is divided into three 
sections. The first part deals with the life of the individual human being 
(pp. 15-73), the second part with the individual’s relationship to another 
human being (pp. 75-93), and the third deals with the individual human 
being’s communication with other human beings (pp. 95-122). The is fol­
lowed by a list of key terms (pp. 123-125) and concludes with pages of 
notes to the introductory preface (p. 126). The book has a simple but bril­
liant title: ‘Søren Kierkegaard i stykker’ [‘Søren Kierkegaard — in pieces’].
The goal of this book is to »liberate Kierkegaard’s fragmentary ex­
travagance« (p. 13), that is to say, to present a series of the original ideas 
and thoughts which are found in Kierkegaard. Here we also find a venue 
for breaking Kierkegaard’s texts into pieces in order to examine how the 
individual parts can function if the are put together in different ways. 
Whether Winkel Holm’s project succeeds, the reader must decide for 
himself. But if it does succeed, then it is mostly due to the fact that the 
author-editor has not, in his presentation, gotten mixed up in the prob­
lems of grammatical corrections, repetitions in ‘New Danish’, commen­
taries, timetables, etc. The references are precise and the reader can 
quickly refer to the quotations in their original contexts, if that is what 
he wants. Individual Latin words are discretely translated in square 
brackets and the publisher has kept »Kierkegaard’s original spelling, ab­
breviations, and peculiarities« (p.14) in all the quotations. The style -  
both internally and externally — is simple, indeed almost soothing, but it
thus stands in sharp contrast to the content. The selection of texts which 
is presented here is overwhelming, and it is only the rare quotation 
which might lend itself to more festive occasions. A typical example 
from The Concept of Anxiety: »Anxiety is freedom’s reality as the possibili­
ty of possibility« (p. 37). Now there’s a quotation you could dwell on for 
an hour or two! A glance at the new text-critical edition tells us that 
there is a high degree of difficulty with this citation, and, indeed, it is so 
difficult that the text-critical publishers have chosen to inform the reader 
that in the manuscript that Kierkegaard actually sent to the printing 
house it says precisely the same thing (Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter 4,348,6 
Cph. 1998). In other words, there is no error or mistake in this citation. 
Yet there are other quotations that are crystal clear: »It is depressing not 
to find someone to whom one can surrender oneself, but it is unutter­
ably depressing not to be able to surrender oneself« (p. 91). In this way, 
the quotations oscillate between the difficult and the easy, with the small 
catch that an easy quotation can be difficult and a difficult quotation 
easy. With this fine selection of quotations, Isak Winkel Holm challenges 
the reader. And it is a challenge that is worth taking up.
Søren Bruun
Charles E. Moore (ed.)
P r o v o c a t io n s :  T h e  S p ir itu a l W r it in g s  o f  K ie r k e g a a r d
The Plough Publishing House, 1999, 430 pp.
The Plough Publishing House is an extension of what might be consid­
ered a rather strange group: The ‘Society of Brothers’ — not a Catholic 
order, mind you, but a ‘Bruderhof’ group found in 1920 in Germany by 
Eberhard Arnold. Although a kind of ‘Hutterian Brethren’, they are not 
the same as, despite having some connections with, ‘The Hutterites’. 
‘The Hutterites’, by contrast, were established in Moravia (now the 
Czech Republic) in the late 1520’s under the auspices of Jacob Wieder- 
man and Jacob Hutter, taking their name from the latter. As we know 
from history, Moravia was a hotbed of proto-reformation and other 
heretical thought, starting with the Bohemian Jan Hus. Jan Hus’ spiritual 
descendants, The Church of the United Brethren, in one of the many 
migrations enforced upon those religious groups which were neither fish 
nor fowl, neither Catholic nor Protestant and thus unallied with any
temporal power, sought refuge on the estates of one Count Nicholas 
Ludwig von Zinzendorf in Saxony in the i 720 s. This group of Mora­
vian Pietists, along with other ‘Protestant’ refugees, formed a communi­
ty which took its name, which means ‘The Lord’s Watch’, from that es­
tate. The name is Herrnhut, and these are Søren Kierkegaard’s spiritual 
forebears. They also form the first wave of modern missionaries. And it 
will be under the influence of such Moravians that one John Wesley will 
come to feel his heart strangely warmed.
Yet when one comes to deal with the theology of such groups, a 
problem arises. They are, obviously, not Catholic. The Catholic Church 
expressed its disapproval of the theology of both Jan Hus and Jacob Hut- 
ter in the form of a fiery martyrdom. And while it is easy, perhaps all too 
easy, to dub in passing such groups as these as Protestant, I beg to differ. 
Unlike Anglicans, Lutherans, Presbyterians, and other Calvinists, these 
groups have never been allied with any state. They are, in the best British 
sense, Dissenters. Dissenting to Protestant Churches. As such, they are not 
churches; they are sects. It was this disagreement with both of the eccle­
siastical powers that be which resulted in the migratory existence of such 
small religious sects as the Moravian Herrnhutters and their eventual im­
migration, like their fellow Quakers, Shakers, Dunkards, and Amish, to 
the New World -  one without political religious persecution. But it also 
resulted in something else: a very personalized understanding of the role 
of scripture and the meaning of the religious life for the sect members, 
both individually and communally. Here we do not find ‘systematic the­
ology’ -  that last breath of life-support provided by Hegel(ianism) to a 
Protestantism whose romance with reason had come to an abrupt end 
thanks to reformed Pietist Kant — nor do we find a reliance on overarch­
ing authority, such as a Pope, despite the existence of bishops, elders and 
such among these various sects. And even what might appear to be a 
rather Orthodox reliance on tradition is bound to be limited in any 
church whose history is less than 500 years old, if that.
And thus we come to the real problem: if one has been divested of 
the three historical hermeneutical favorites: namely, tradition, authority, 
and ‘reason’, where is a ‘believer’ to go in search of interpretation and 
insight? Well, a radical solution obtained: a personal relationship with 
Christ through the Holy Spirt, the Paraclete, a spirit of truth cum her- 
meneut ‘who will teach you all things’ (see John 14) including, apparent­
ly, the Scriptures. Radical, indeed.
And now to the text under review. It is not a scholarly text in the
wissenschaftlich sense of the word. Nor is it intended to be such. Rather, 
it reflects a trend (seen in books like The Parables of Kierkegaard, for in­
stance, and The Prayers of Kierkegaard) to wrest the melancholy Dane out 
of the hands of academics and place him in the hands of those he himself 
expressed a rather marked interest in: the man on the street, the woman 
in the marketplace. It also follows along the lines of other Plough books 
such as The Gospel in Dostoyevsky; Walk in the Light — a collection of tales 
by Tolstoy, and the rather delightfully entitled The Early Christians: In 
Their Own Words by Eberhard Arnold. This set of books is, I believe, an 
attempt at making primitive Christianity, early Christianity — yea, what 
C.S. Lewis had called mere Christianity, true regardless of time or place 
— accessible to people regardless of time or place.
Does this book perpetuate the dread heresy of the theory of stages? 
Why, yes, it does. And so? Heresies are truths taken to extremes by the 
disregarding other truths. In other words, they are not necessarily wrong; 
they are unbalanced. They are, in fact, provocative. But theories, in the 
end, matter most to those for whom how something is being said is more 
important than what is being said, and that is not the audience intended 
here. This is the book for the mother, the grandfather, the friend, the 
co-worker who, in looking for devotional or inspiration literature, does 
not share your enthusiasm for Works of Love or any of the various and 
sundry ‘Edifying Discourses’ and who politely, but firmly, and with a 
rather troubled look, returned unfinished your copy of Fear and Trem­
bling, yet who has nevertheless been rather fascinated by what you’ve 
been saying about the erstwhile Dane for years and years and years.
Also, it has to be admitted that the pseudonyms and the journals do 
frolic together namelessly on the same page. Even though textual anno­
tation is provided at the end of the book, no mention is made in the text 
proper. This will be troublesome to those who would grant Kierke­
gaard’s wish and hold the pseudonyms apart. And thus I return to my 
beginning, and my circle is complete. For this is not a book for the 
scholarly. It is a book for the believing. If it is to be appreciated for what 
it is, it should not be approached with the hermeneutics of suspicion but 
rather with the hermeneutics of faith. Otherwise, it is nonsense. As it 
should be. It owes its existence not to a need for understanding but the 
desire for edification. And it belongs to the reader who accepts that the 




S ø r e n  K ierk eg a a rd : E t  a u te n t is k  l iv
[Søren Kierkegaard: An authentic Life]
K ierk eg a a rd s  la n g e  o g  tr a n g e  vej m o d  å n d e l ig  a fk la r in g
C. A. Reitzels Forlag og Forlaget Scandinavia 
Copenhagen 1998, 120 pp.
In the series ‘Spiritual Geniuses’ whose goal, in the words of the pub­
lisher, is to introduce the public to ‘some of the great geniuses of histo­
ry’, the lot has now fallen to Søren Kierkegaard. The book, which is in­
troduced with »a personal preface« (pp. 6-9), is divided into two parts. 
The first part is entitled ‘Kierkegaard’s World’ and consists of five small 
sections (pp. 13-69). Here the reader is initiated into Kierkegaard’s life 
and work, a process undertaken in part by the author and in part by 
means of various interviews with a host of Kierkegaard researchers. The 
second part consists of ‘Selected Texts from Kierkegaard’s works’ (pp. 
71-117). The book concludes with a timetable (pp. 118-119).
At first glance, this book looks like an introduction to Søren Kierke­
gaard’s life and thought, but even in the introductory preface, which has 
the character of a personal testimony, it becomes clear that the book has 
more to do with the publisher’s own journey of spiritual self-discovery 
than with »Kierkegaard’s long and narrow path to spiritual self-discov­
ery«. The writer’s journey begins at the Copenhagen City Museum, 
where the mere viewing of Kierkegaard’s personal writing desk invokes 
in a most mysterious way a meeting with the genius himself: »In a frac­
tion of a second, it felt as if I had left my body and entered into his body 
and mind, and I experienced an amazingly melancholic rapture, a kind 
of creative energy that did not come from me« (p. 7). His subsequent 
readings of Kierkegaard’s authorship results in the author’s crossing »great 
gaps found within the subterranean regions of his soul« (p. 7). And this, 
in all truth, is what the book is really about. It should come as no sur­
prise, then, when, the author declares without apology that the book 
aims at »an evangelical market« (p. 9). By this, he admits that he is really 
using the Kierkegaardian text as a means and not as a goal. Moreover, 
there is not even a hint of a genuine introduction to Kierkegaard’s 
thought. Introducing others to Kierkegaard’s authorship is not a simple 
task, and it requires a certain critical distance. A distance which is here
rather sadly lacking. The book has — apart from the interspersed inter­
views and some biografical information -  an overwhelmingly subjective 
bias, revealing a certain incapacity on the part of the author to place 
himself in relation to the subjects at hand. The many -  all too many -  
postcard-like illustrations are decidedly kitsch: the Bible and the Danish 
Church Hymnal (salmebog) arranged on a table with burning candles, 
(pp. 70), sunflowers in verdant, blossoming meadows, etc. All of which 
are graced by a host of selected and formulated quotations from Kierke­
gaard’s texts, and they are occasionally presented on pages where the 
background is composed of fragments from Kierkegaard’s manuscripts, 
albeit enlarged and colorized. The pages of illustrations stand in com­
plete and sharp contrast to the book’s professed goal. Not a single illus­
tration re-creates either the anxiety or the despair which are some of the 
book’s purported themes. It is also unfortunate that the book contains a 
number of factual inaccuracies. For example, Kierkegaard did not return 
from his first trip to Berlin in 1841 (p. 38), but in 1842, and Kierkegaard 
was not taken, in October of 1855, to Frederiksberg Hospital (p. 58, p. 
119) — it had not even yet been built — but to the old Royal Hospital, 
Frederiks Hospital, on Bredgade, now the Danish Museum of Decora­
tive Arts. Furthermore, the references to Kierkegaard’s works are not 
precise and the reader can only with great difficulty find the quotations 
in their original contexts. In other words: The reader is left behind. He 
or she is given no possibility whatsoever of studying the text in its own 
proper environment. The author has eliminated the possibility for each 
individual reader to decide whether a quotation can tolerate being torn 
out of a larger context.
The book was undoubtedly undertaken with good intentions, and 
the strong involvement of the author in the project is obvious, but this is 
not enough. This book ought not to be regarded as an introduction to 
Kierkegaard, but as a religious experience which, almost by sheer coin­
cidence, happens to involve Kierkegaard. Apart from the interviews the 
book lacks a critical approach, and thus Kierkegaard’s texts remain un­
mediated. Whether the book will succeed in the »evangelical market« (p. 
7) is for others to decide, but chances are good.
Søren Bruun
